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Friday, December 30, 2022
Wu-Chin Modifications - A Guide
Guide to Taiwanese Modified Gearing-class
HD - 12/30/2022
WU CHIN 1 (武進一型作戰系統)
Ships modified to the Wu Chin 1 standard possessed a weapons suite of:
- [1x2] Mk. 38 5" gun in the bow 'A' position.
- [1x1] Oto Melara 3" gun in the foredeck 'B' position.
- [2x3] Mk. 32 324mm triple torpedo launchers slightly aft of 3" gun.
- [2x2] Bofors 40mm L/70 anti-aircraft guns midships, ahead of DASH hangar.
- [1x8] RUR-5 ASROC anti-submarine launcher midships (FRAM 1 ships only).
- [3x1] Hsiung Feng 1 anti-ship missiles on the aft deck.
- [1x4] Sea Chaparral surface-to-air missile launcher on the aft deck, behind AShMs.
Ships modified to the Wu Chin 1 standard were as follows:
- DDG-926, Suei-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1987. Depicted below.
- DDG-907, Fu-Yang, FRAM 2, modified 1980.
- Received [2x1] Hsiung Feng 2 missiles in 1992.
WU CHIN 2 (武進二型作戰系統)
Ships modified to the Wu Chin 2 standard possessed a weapons suite of:
- [1x1] Oto Melara 3" gun in the bow 'A' position.
- [3x1] Hsiung Feng 1 anti-ship missiles on the foredeck.
- [2x3] Mk. 32 324mm triple torpedo launchers, located on foredeck.
- [1x8] RUR-5 ASROC anti-submarine launcher midships (FRAM 1 ships only).
- [2x1] Hsiung Feng 1 anti-ship missiles on top of DASH hangar.
Ships modified to the Wu Chin 2 standard were as follows:
- DDG-911, Dang-Yang, FRAM 2, modified 1980.
- DDG-915, Han-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1978.
- Modified by U.S. for add'l CBRN protection.
- DDG-920, Lai-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1980.
- DDG-924, Kai-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1980.
WU CHIN 3 (武進三型作戰系統)
Ships modified to the Wu Chin 3 standard possessed a weapons suite of:
- [1x1] Oto Melara 3" gun in the bow 'A' position.
- [2x3] Mk. 32 324mm triple torpedo launchers, located on foredeck.
- [2x2] RIM-66 anti-aircraft missile launchers, 'B' position.
- [1x8] RUR-5 ASROC anti-submarine launcher midships (FRAM 1 ships only).
- [2x2] Bofors 40mm L/70 anti-aircraft guns midships, ahead of DASH hangar.
- [1x4] Hsiung Feng 2 anti-ship missiles midships.
- [1x1] Mk. 15 Phalanx 20mm CIWS, aft deck.
- [2x3] RIM-66 anti-aircraft missile launchers, aft deck.
- DDG-921, Liao-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1991.
- DDG-912, Jian-Yang, FRAM 1, mod. unknown.
- DDG-923, Shen-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1991,
- Received HF-2, 1995
- DDG-925, De-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1987. Depicted below.
- DDG-927,Yun-Yang, F(1), modified 1986.
- DDG-928, Zheng-Yang, FRAM 1, mod. unknown.
- DDG-929, Shao-Yang, FRAM 1, modified 1990.
Sources:
LCS for Taiwan?
Littoral Combat Ships in the Strait?
Regarding the ROCN, there is an urge to obtain some sort of larger surface combatant, suitable for 'grey zone' deterrence.
After the PLAN naval exercises in the wake of Rep. Pelosi's visit, it was perceived that though the Navy's Tuo Jiang and Ta-chiang-class 600-700t corvettes are crucial to asymmetrical defence of Taiwan, you need something 1500 to 2000 tons to effectively 'ward off' Chinese incursions. Older 'first line' combatants--i.e. the precious Kidds, were forced to respond in the absence of a credible 'second line' warship--taxing the primary surface combatants and most potent anti-aircraft ships possessed by the ROCN.
The 輕型巡防艦 (lit. Light Frigate) plan, one of twelve modernisation efforts being implemented under the current Tsai administration, and efforts primarily seem to focus on acquiring a OTS or secondhand platform. Politicos and netizens have suggested joining the Constellation-class program, or even acquiring decommisioned Ticonderoga-class cruisers.
One former captain of a Ching Chiang-class missile boat has suggested the acquisition of decommissioned Littoral Combat Ships to fulfill this requirement for a newer, second-line combatant.
Captain Lu asserts that the 10.000t Ticonderogas are most likely going to be anchored in or around Guam to provide additional air defence and surveillance capability, and that with the failure of AEGIS Ashore in Japan, it is likely the USN will continue to extend the life of the Ticonderogas. Furthermore, the ROCN does not possess at the present berths suitable for such large warships, and the one available are commercial and deficient in force protection.
As for the Constellation-class, Capt. Lu asserts that similar to the failure of the ROCAF to acquire F-35 Joint Strike Fighters from the United States, which began in 2002, it is unlikely that the ROCN will be allowed to participate or purchase the latest surface combatants being developed by the USN; Political concerns over escalating cross-Strait and international tensions would preclude any agreement or deal concerning those.
Capt. Lu concludes that the Littoral Combat Ship is the only viable solution to the ROCN’s need for a second-line combatant. He argues that aside from the lack of an anti-submarine module for the Freedom-class, Littoral Combat Ships suit the political and strategic needs of the ROC. The MCM mission package is vital to freedom of operation in the crowded Taiwan Strait, and can also fill the capability gap for the ROCN in regards to minehunting capabilities.
Capt. Lu does not address the perceived ‘weaknesses’ of the LCS in American service; however, the diminished range, lack of area air defence, and popularised ‘impotence’ of the LCS are likely to favour the ROCN in acquiring such vessels. Compared to the escalatory impacts of acquiring Constellation-class frigates, Littoral Combat Ships may incur decreased PRC threats and economic sanctions.
Furthermore, with the decommissioning of several, relatively new LCS, and the 2023 NDAA signed into the law by Pres. Biden containing directives to kickstart a joint modernisation plan for the ROC armed forces, it is likely that the transfer of LCS to the ROCN has been considered on Capitol Hill and the Pentagon. It would not be the first export or transfer of the LCS either; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has procured four Freedom-class based combatants.
In 2010, it had reported that the ROCN was actively assessing the LCS. In 2022, Dep. Defence Minister Bai Honghui announced, in response to lawmakers’ queries, that the ROC MoD has been considering the acquisition of littoral combat ships as well. Opposing statements from other naval officials have emerged, however, claiming that the maintenance cost of the LCS are too high for the ROCN.
If the ROCN is to acquire foreign vessels in the next three years, it is likely that they will be American Littoral Combat Ships; the renewed, and long-standing defence ties between the two countries, the increased need of the ROC to maintain its maritime sovereignty in face of mounting Chinese incursions, and availability of the LCS all are in its favour. Domestic political circumstances in Taipei are possible upsets, however; Guomindang legislators are unlikely to countenance measures that could be seen as ‘aggressively pro-independence’.
HD - 12/30/2022
Sources:
https://www.sohu.com/a/537260650_115479
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=2&SerialNo=155235
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=2&SerialNo=155579
http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1152955&lang=eng_news
https://www.edrmagazine.eu/lockheed-martin-new-milestones-and-developments-for-saudi-mmsc-programme
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Littoral Combat Ships in the Strait? Regarding the ROCN, there is an urge to obtain some sort of larger surface combatant, suitable for ...
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Guide to Taiwanese Modified Gearing -class HD - 12/30/2022 WU CHIN 1 (武進一型作戰系統) Ships modified to the Wu Chin 1 standard possessed a weapo...
